Each semivalue, as a solution concept defined on cooperative games with a finite set of players, is univocally determined by weighting coefficients that apply to players' marginal contributions. Taking into account that a semivalue induces semivalues on lower cardinalities, we prove that its weighting coefficients can be reconstructed from the last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues. Moreover, we provide the conditions of a sequence of numbers in order to be the family of the last coefficients of any induced semivalues. As a consequence of this fact, we give two characterizations of each semivalue defined on cooperative games with a finite set of players: one, among all semivalues; another, among all solution concepts on cooperative games.
Introduction
Semivalues were introduced by Weber [26] in the context of simple games (see also Einy [17] ). In 1981, Dubey et al. [16] proposed the family of semivalues on all cooperative games, each one of which is defined by weighting coefficients that apply to the marginal contributions v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) and are common to all coalitions of the same size. This new notion includes both, the Shapley value [25] and the Banzhaf value, defined by Owen [22] -an extension to all cooperative games of the original Banzhaf power index [3] -. In 1988, Weber [27] went further, dropped anonymity, and defined the family of probabilistic values, each one of which requires weighting coefficients p i S for each player i and each coalition S ⊆ N \{i} (of course, anonymity characterizes semivalues within this new family).
Several authors have been especially concerned with semivalues. Dragan [12] gives different interesting properties of semivalues as well as in [14, 15] the inverse problem is considered. Calvo and Santos [5] and Dragan [13] independently get a potential for every semivalue. Grabisch and Roubens [18] consider some properties of probabilistic interactions among the players in order to characterize solution concepts. In [19] axiomatizations of the probabilistic interaction indices are proposed and in [28] the additive efficient normalization of a semivalue is axiomatized. Our research group has also been studying semivalues. Carreras and Freixas [6] introduce regular semivalues. Carreras and Freixas [8] show the semivalue versatility as a very interesting tool for practical applications. Puente [24] devotes most of her PhD. thesis to semivalues and, especially, to their action on simple games. In [9] , a restricted notion of semivalue as a power index, i.e., as a value for simple games, is axiomatically introduced. In the analysis of certain cooperative problems we have successfully used binomial semivalues, a single parametric subfamily defined by Puente [24] (see also [20] and [1] ) that includes the Banzhaf value [22] . In [10] the binomial semivalues are used to study the effects of the partnership formation in cooperative games, comparing the joint effect on the involved players with the alternative alliance formation. Carreras and Puente [11] introduced symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues, a new family of coalitional values designed to take into account players' attitudes with regard cooperation. This new family applies to cooperative games with a coalition structure by combining the Shapley value and the binomial semivalues.
The payoff that a semivalue allocates to every player in a game is a weighted sum of his marginal contributions in the game, provided that all the coalitions of a common size have the same weighting coefficient. Following the characterization of semivalues by means of weighting coefficients given by Dubey et al. [16] , every family of weighting coefficients having as many components as players in the game is associated to a unique semivalue if, and only if, these weighting coefficients satisfy a simple condition of normalization.
As it is well known, semivalues for cooperative games are defined on car-dinalities rather than on specific player sets: this means that the n weighting coefficients define a semivalue on all set N such that n = |N |. Moreover, a semivalue on N induces semivalues for all cardinalities t < n, recurrently defined by the Pascal triangle (inverse) formula given by Dragan [12] . The present paper focuses on the weighting coefficients that univocally characterize a semivalue. First of all, we prove that these weighting coefficients can be reconstructed from the last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues. After that, in order to obtain the weighting coefficients of the original semivalue, several conditions for the last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues are provided.
As it is well known, the unanimity games form a basis of the vector space of the cooperative games and a semivalue is completely determined by its action on any unanimity game. The fact that the payoff that a semivalue allocates to each player in these games is closely related with the last weighting coefficient of the induced semivalues allows us to characterize each semivalue within the set of all semivalues defined on cooperative games with a finite set of players. In order to provide an individual axiomatization of each semivalue among all solution concepts on cooperative games, one nonstandard property, called "Successively bounded allocations in unanimity games" will be introduced and combined with the classical properties of linearity, anonymity and dummy player property.
According to the above considerations, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a minimum of preliminaries related to cooperative games and semivalues, paying special attention to the weighting coefficients that define each semivalue. In Section 3 we focus on the last weighting coefficients of the induced semivalues in order to establish conditions that allow us to reconstruct the weighting coefficients associated to the original semivalue. Finally, in Section 4, we give two characterizations of each semivalue defined on games with a finite set of players: one, among all semivalues; another, among all solution concepts on cooperative games.
Preliminaries on semivalues
Let N be a finite set of players and 2 N be the set of its coalitions (subsets of N ). A cooperative game with transferable utility on N is a function v : 2 N → R, which assigns a real number v(S) to each coalition S ⊆ N and satisfies v(
A player i ∈ N is called dummy in a game v ∈ G N if all marginal contributions of the player to the coalitions to which it belongs equal its individual utility in the game, i.e., v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) + v({i}) for all S ⊆ N \{i}.
Endowed with the natural operations for real-valued functions, denoted by v + v and λv for λ ∈ R, the set of all cooperative games on N is a vector space G N . For every nonempty coalition T ⊆ N , the unanimity game u T is defined on N by u T (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and u T (S) = 0 otherwise, and it is easily checked that the set of all unanimity games is a basis for G N , so that dim(G N ) = 2 n − 1 if n = |N |. Each game v ∈ G N can then be uniquely written as a linear combination of unanimity games, and its components are the Harsanyi dividends (Harsanyi [21] 
and, as usual, t = |T | and s = |S|. The additive games form a linear subspace of G N that we denote as AG N and is spanned by the set {u {i} : i ∈ N } formed by unanimity games on singletons. Finally, every permutation θ of N induces a linear automorphism of G N that leaves invariant AG N and is defined by
By a solution or a value on G N we will mean a map f :
Following Weber's [27] axiomatic description, ψ : G N → R N is a semivalue iff it satisfies the following properties:
There is an interesting characterization of semivalues, by means of weighting coefficients, due to Dubey, Neyman and Weber [16] . Theorem 2.1 (a) For every nonnegative weighting coefficients (p s ) n−1 s=0 such that
where s = |S|, defines a semivalue ψ; (b) conversely, every semivalue can be obtained in this way; (c) the correspondence (p s ) n−1 s=0 → ψ is bijective.
Thus, the payoff that a semivalue allocates to every player in any game is a weighted sum of his marginal contributions in the game. If p k is interpreted as the probability that a given player i joins a coalition of size k, provided that all the coalitions of a common size have the same probability of being joined, then ψ i [v] is the expected marginal contribution of that player to a random coalition he joins.
Well known examples of semivalues are the Shapley value ϕ, for which
, and the Banzhaf value β, for which p s = 2 1−n . The Shapley value ϕ is the only efficient semivalue, in the sense that i∈N ϕ i [v] = v(N ) for every v ∈ G N . It is noteworthy that these two classical values are defined for each N .
As a generalization of the Banzhaf value we find the family of binomial semivalues (Puente [24] , Giménez [20] , Amer and Giménez [1] ) introduced as follows. Let α ∈ [0, 1] and p s = α s (1 − α) n−s−1 for s = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. Then {p s } n−1 s=0 are the weighting coefficients and define a semivalue that will be denoted as ψ α and called the α-binomial semivalue. Using the convention that 0 0 = 1, the definition makes sense also for α = 0 and α = 1, where we respectively get the dictatorial index ψ 0 = δ and the marginal index ψ 1 = µ, introduced by Owen [23] and such that δ
In fact, semivalues are defined on cardinalities rather than on specific player sets: this means that a family of weighting coefficients (p s ) n−1 s=0 defines a semivalue ψ on all N such that n = |N |. When necessary, we shall write ψ n for a semivalue on cardinality n and p n s for its weighting coefficients. This often matters since a semivalue ψ = ψ n on cardinality n gives rise to induced semivalues ψ t for all cardinalities t such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1, recurrently defined by their weighting coefficients, which are given by an expression obtained by Dubey et al. [16] and referred by Dragan ([12] , [13] ) as the Pascal triangle (inverse) formula:
It is not difficult to check that the induced semivalues of the Shapley value (resp., the α-binomial semivalue) are all Shapley values (resp., α-binomial semivalues for the same α). By applying (4) repeatedly, one gets the expression of the weighting coefficients of any induced semivalue in terms of the coefficients of the original semivalue, 
Recovering weighting coefficients
In particular, Eq. (5) allows us to determine the last weighting coefficient of each induced semivalue of ψ n from its weighting coefficients:
The latter expression is useful for cases 2 ≤ t ≤ n − 1. In case t = 1, according to condition (2), p 1 0 = 1. The following result provides a kind of inverse formula for the weighting coefficients of any semivalue in terms of the last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues. Lemma 3.1 Let ψ n be a semivalue defined on G N . Its weighting coefficients p n s can be recovered from the last weighting coefficients p t t−1 of its induced semivalues ψ t as follows:
Proof. Since p n−1 n−2 = p n n−2 + p n n−1 , it follows p n n−2 = p n−1 n−2 − p n n−1 , that proves (7) for s = n − 2.
Assume that Eq. (7) holds for values s with k ≤ s ≤ n − 2; we will prove that it still holds for s = k − 1. Eq. (6) for t = k,
allows us to separate coefficient p n k−1 and to apply the induction hypothesis:
where the last equality derives from n−k
Following Theorem 2.1, each selection of a family of weighting coefficients (p s ) n−1 s=0 univocally defines a semivalue on cooperative games with n players if, and only if, these weights satisfy Eq. (2). The weighting coefficients of the semivalue lead us to the last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues p t t−1 (1 < t ≤ n − 1) and, conversely, the previous Lemma shows that all these last weighting coefficients are able to recover the weighting coefficients of the semivalue. The following result gives some restrictions for the last weighting coefficients of the induced semivalues. Proposition 3.2 (a) Let ψ be a semivalue on G N with weighting coefficients (p n s ) n−1 s=0 . The last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues are successively bounded according to the following expressions
and
(b) In the set of all semivalues on G N , it is always possible to find semivalues satisfying the equalities in (i) or in (ii).
Proof. (a) The nonnegativity condition of all weighting coefficients (p n s ) n−1 s=0 leads us to p n n−1 ≥ 0 and, at the same time, from Eq. (2), p n n−1 ≤ 1 holds and Part (i) in the statement has been proved. Now we prove the inequalities in (ii). Lemma 3.1 shows that every weighting coefficient p n s can be written in terms of the last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues. Applying it to p n s−1 ,
and hence
Analogously, for s = n − 1, . . . , 2, from Eq. (2),
and consequently,
After some calculations in the inner sum, we can write
Finally, it is not difficult to see that
and, in this way, the previous inequality becomes
n − s t − s p t t−1 for s = n−1, n−2, . . . , 2.
(b) According to Eq. (2), p n n−1 = 0 is achieved by all semivalue satisfying n−2 s=0 n−1 s p n s = 1, whereas p n n−1 = 1 is only reached by the marginal index µ.
In the extreme case p s s−1 = q s in (ii), Eqs. (11) and (10) The previous Proposition proves that the last weighting coefficients of each induced semivalue are bounded and their bounds depend on the last weighting coefficients of the induced semivalues defined on games with more players. From now on, we ask what amounts may be admissible for p t t−1 (1 < t ≤ n) so that when we go back and find the coefficients p n s (0 ≤ s ≤ n − 1), they effectively define a semivalue on n-person games. In other words, is it possible to find a formula similar to expression (2) for the last weighting coefficients of any induced semivalues? A partial answer can be found in the next theorem, where some conditions are given so that a sequence of real numbers becomes admissible as a family of the last weighting coefficients. Theorem 3.3 A family of numbers (k n , k n−1 , ..., k 2 ) can be sequentially chosen in order to be the last weighting coefficients of the induced semivalues of a semivalue ψ defined on G N , starting by p n n−1 and decreasing until p 2 1 , if, and only if, it is verified:
Proof. (⇒) It easily follows from part (a) in Proposition 3.2, identifying k n = p n n−1 , . . ., k 2 = p 2 1 . (⇐) All number k n with 0 ≤ k n ≤ 1 is admissible as the weighting coefficient p n n−1 of some semivalue. Suppose sequentially given the numbers (k n , k n−1 , ..., k t ) admissible as (p n n−1 , p n−1 n−2 , ..., p t t−1 ) for n − 2 ≥ t ≥ 2, then from part (b) in Proposition 3.2, and by continuity, all the values of k t−1 with q t−1 ≤ k t−1 ≤ Q t−1 are admissible as the last weighting coefficient p t−1 t−2 of some semivalue.
Introduced by Carreras and Freixas [6] , the so-called regular semivalues constitute a particular type of semivalues whose weighting coefficients are positive. In this case, all marginal contributions of each player matter when the allocation by such a semivalue is considered. The Shapley value and every αbinomial semivalue for α ∈ (0, 1) are regular semivalues. Interesting properties on regular semivalues can be found in [6] , specially their nice behavior with regard to strict monotonicity, which characterizes them. Even, a system of axioms characterizing each regular semivalue is provided in [2] .
With the same notations as in Theorem 3.3, a result specially adapted to regular semivalues can be formulated. Corollary 3.4 A family of numbers (k n , k n−1 , ..., k 2 ) can be sequentially chosen in order to be the last weighting coefficients of the induced semivalues of a regular semivalue ψ, starting by p n n−1 and decreasing until p 2 1 , if, and only if, it is verified:
Remark 3.5 In a first approximation, it seems that Eqs. (13) and (14) for the bounds q s and Q s are rather complicated. Next, we offer formulae for the first values of q s and Q s . Bounds for p n−1 n−2 (n > 2): q n−1 = k n ; Q n−1 = 1 n − 1 + n − 2 n − 1 k n .
Bounds for p n−2 n−3 (n > 3): q n−2 = 2k n−1 − k n ;
Bounds for p n−3 n−4 (n > 4): q n−3 = 3k n−2 − 3k n−1 + k n ;
Example 3.6 Let G N be the vector space of five-player games. (a) We will prove that the sequence of numbers (0.24, 0.36, 0.49, 0.65) is admissible as the last weighting coefficients (p 5 4 , p 4 3 , p 3 2 , p 2 1 ) of the induced semivalues of some semivalue ψ 5 on G N .
It is clear that 0 < 0.24 < 1 and, by using the formulae given in the previous Remark for n = 5, we have 
From these last weighting coefficients (p 5 4 , p 4 3 , p 3 2 , p 2 1 , p 1 0 ) = (0.24, 0.36, 0.49, 0.65, 1.00), the remaining weighting coefficients of every induced semivalue ψ t , 1 ≤ t ≤ 5, can be reconstructed and, in particular, of the semivalue ψ 5 . To do that, it is enough to consider a triangular table as in Example 2.2 but now starting with the known coefficients (in bold) and then proceeding from left to right and from bottom to top: The strict inequalities in (15) guarantee the condition of regular semivalue, as it has been obtained. Nevertheless, a procedure as in part (a) can be carried out and a triangular table can be constructed. In this case, the obtained numbers are all positive except in the first column where we would get (0.09, −0.02, 0.07, 0.11, 0.13). These amounts are not the weighting coefficients of any semivalue on fiveplayer games.
Unanimity games and semivalues
Since the unanimity games form a basis of G N , through linearity, a semivalue is completely determined by its action on any unanimity game. In this section we raise the following question: suppose to define a linear value in a finite set of players by allocating k s to players belonging to S in the unanimity game u S , where s = |S|. Then, under which conditions do the assignments of k s define a semivalue? This problem has been studied recently by Bernardi and Lucchetti [4] . In their work they established a sufficient condition to build semivalues via the unanimity games by means of completely monotonic sequences. Our goal is to obtain sequentially bounded intervals for all admissible players' allocations in the unanimity games.
The next Lemma relates the last weighting coefficients p s s−1 of the induced semivalues ψ s , 1 ≤ s ≤ n, studied in Section 3, to the allocations on the unanimity games u S in the original vector space G N . 
and Q S are given in Theorem 3.3.
(b) ψ is the only semivalue whose weighting coefficients (p n s ) n−1 s=0 are given by
whereas in all cases Following with the unanimity games u N \{j} , j ∈ N , and for any i ∈ N \{j},
Choosing p n n−1 as k n , the admissible values for ψ i [u N \{j} ], i.e., k n−1 , depend on p n n−2 . An extreme case for k n + p n n−2 = k n−1 arises for p n n−2 = 0 and then k n−1 = k n . The first lower bound q n−1 in (ii) is achieved. The other extreme case for p n 0 = · · · = p n n−3 = 0 leads us to p n n−2 = (1 − k n )/(n − 1) and then
The first upper bound Q n−1 in (ii) is reached. Decreasing the cardinal of S, we can repeat the same procedure for the remaining unanimity games u S and the respective bounds in (ii) are also reached.
Remark 4.4
The previous Proposition allows us to characterize a single semivalue within the set of all semivalues on cooperative games with a given set of players N . Notice that Eq. (16) can be written as
As we will see, the previous result combined with the classical properties (A1), (A2) and (A3) will help us to characterize each individual semivalue among all the solution concepts defined on the set of cooperative games G N . To achieve this, a nonstandard property should be considered:
(A5) Successively bounded allocations in unanimity games. Let X be an allocation rule on G N . Given a family of real numbers (k n , k n−1 , . . . , k 2 ) with k n ∈ [0, 1] and k s ∈ [q s , Q s ] for s = n − 1, . . . , 2, where each q s and Q s is defined in Eqs. (13) and (14), then X i [u S ] = k s ∀i ∈ S and ∀S ⊆ N with 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
In fact, Property (A5) is a family of properties given through each "valid" selection of numbers (k n , k n−1 , . . . , k 2 ), where "valid" should be interpreted as the only allocations that the semivalues can offer to the players in the unanimity games, according to the relation between these allocations and the last weighting coefficients of its induced semivalues previously proved in Lemma 4.1. The recursive method used to obtain "valid" selections of numbers (k n , k n−1 , . . . , k 2 ) has been already showed in Remark 4.3. In turn, each of these allocation families characterizes and provides the semivalue. Theorem 4.5 (a) For every selection of real numbers (k n , k n−1 , . . . , k 2 ) with k n ∈ [0, 1] and successively bounded according to Eqs. (13) and (14), there is a unique allocation rule X : G N → R N that satisfies properties (A1), (A2), (A3) and (A5) for these given numbers. (b) This allocation rule is the semivalue ψ with weighting coefficients (p n s ) n−1 s=0 given by
Proof. (Existence) We prove that the semivalue ψ given in (b) satisfies the four properties. It is clear that properties (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold for all semivalue. Property (A5) follows by applying Proposition 4.2 and the fact that each player i ∈ N is a dummy in the unanimity game u {i} and consequently ψ i [u {i} ] = 1 for all semivalue defined on G N .
(Uniqueness) Let X be an allocation rule on G N that satisfies the stated properties. We will show that X is uniquely determined in all v ∈ G N , so that it must coincide with ψ.
Through linearity, we only have to prove that X is uniquely determined in each unanimity game u S . By the dummy player property, X i [u S ] = 0 if i / ∈ S. This leaves us with the players of S. Moreover, all players in S are symmetric in u S and, according to Property (A2), their allocations are coincident. Finally, if S = {i}, according to Property (A3), X i [u S ] is well determined, and, according to Property (A5), for the remaining coalitions S with 1 < s ≤ n.
Example 4.6 Let G N be the vector space of five-player games. We would like to know if there exists one solution X on G N that satisfies linearity, anonymity, dummy player property and that assigns the following allocations to the players in the respective unanimity games: 
